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Appellant- Scott Rice, an individual (Rice) 
Appellee- Express Recovery Services, Inc. a debt collection agency (ERS) 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter under U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(4), as this is an 
appeal of a final order of the Fourth District Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL 
APPELLANT'S ISSUE NO. 1: Did the District Court err in finding and/or concluding that 
Appellant Scott Rice (Rice) was personally liable for the debt owed to Appelle's (ERS) 
predecessor, Phone Directories Company (Directories), when he signed as President of Memory 
Technology, Inc. (MTI), a Utah Corporation, then in good standing? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE NO. 1: This is an issue of law as the facts are 
undisputed. It involves the interpretation of U.C.A § 16-10a-1421 and § 16-10a-1422. This 
Court reviews issues of law for correctness and no deference need be given the lower Court. 
Mackay v. Hardy, 973 P. 2d 941, 944 (Utah 1998) (citing Drake v. Industrial Comm. 939 P.2d 
177,181 (Utah 1997). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE NO. 1: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the 
lower Court. 
APPELLANT'S ISSUE NO. 2: Did the District Court err in concluding that paragraph 11 of the 
contract between Directories and MTI created personal liability on behalf of Rice (when he 
signed as President of MTI), based solely on the administrative dissolution of MTI, when MTI 
was later reinstated prior to the trial? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE NO. 2: This is an issue of law and is subject to the 
correctness standard of review. See, Mackay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah 1998). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE NO. 2: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the 
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lower Court. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-1421 and 1422. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises from a contract collection action brought by Express Recovery 
Services (ERS) against Rice and MTI as a dba of Rice. The trial court granted judgment against 
Rice and MTI. Rice now appeals the issue of his personal liability to ERS under the contract 
entered into by MTI, which was at the time of the contract a valid Utah Corporation. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The case was filed by ERS in 2003 seeking judgment against Rice and MTI based on a 
contract for advertising entered into between ERS's predecessor, Directories, and MTI. After a 
bench trial judgment was rendered in favor of ERS for $5,601.45, including attorneys fees and 
against MTI and Rice personally. 
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
Paragraph 11 of the contract reads: 
11. If Advertiser sells or discontinues business before or after 
publication of the Directory, no payment or amount due under the 
terms of this contact will be waived thereby. The signer of the 
Contract guarantees payment of the amount due either directly or 
through escrow if business is sold. Payment or amount due may be 
assumed by the New Owner, if name of business and phone 
number remain the same. 
The trial court held that under this contract provision, Rice had personally guaranteed the 
contract, because MTI had been administratively dissolved, and therefore, MTI had discontinued 
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business, even though MTI had been reinstated under U.C.A. § 16-10a-1422 prior to trial. 
Judgment was awarded against Rice personally for the debt. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts germane to this appeal are not in dispute: 
1. Rice signed a contract with Directories (which contract was assigned to ERS) on 
October 13, 2001 as President of MTI, a Utah Corporation in good standing. Rice was 
authorized to enter into contracts on behalf of MTI. (Findings ^ 2). 
2. The contract involved advertising Directories was to provide for MTI. (Findings % 
1.) A dispute arose regarding the advertising, and MTI refused to pay. The Court found money 
was due to Directories/ ERS under the contract. The contract was the basis for the debt. 
(Findings 1fl[ 6-8, Conclusions ^ 6). 
3. At the time that this action was commenced against Rice and MTI, MTI had been 
administratively dissolved by the Department of Commerce for allowing the corporate status to 
expire. (Findings ^ 10). 
4. At the time of trial MTI had been reinstated and was valid corporation. (Findings 
paragraph 11). 
5. The contract signed by Rice as President of MTI contained a provision at 
paragraph 11, which states: 
If Advertiser sells or discontinues business, no payment or amount 
due under the terms of the contract will be waived thereby. The 
signer of the contract guarantees payment of the amount due either 
directly or through escrow if the business is sold. Payment or 
amount due may be assumed by the New Owner, if name of 
business and phone number remains the same. 
(Findings UK 13-14). 
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6. The District Court found, solely based on the administrative suspension of MTI 
after the signing of the contract, that MTI had "discontinued" business and that Rice was 
therefore personally liable for the debt solely under the contractual provision described above. 
(Findings 12, 13 and 14; Conclusions 3, 4 and 5). 
7. The personal liability of Rice based upon undisputed facts is the only issue on this 
appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is only one issue, with two subparts relevant to the appeal. The lower Court erred 
in holding Rice personally liable for the debt owed to ERS when he signed the contract which 
created the debt, as President of MTI. At the time of signing of the contract in October 2001 
MTI was a valid, active Utah Corporation. MTI was administratively dissolved after the contract 
was signed. MTI was reinstated prior to the trial, and was a valid corporation at the time of trial. 
Rice is not personally liable for two reasons. First, paragraph 11 does not create personal 
liability for Rice under any circumstances, and second, even assuming arguendo, that paragraph 
11 of the contract creates personally liability, it does not do so under the facts of this case where 
the contact was signed by Rice as President of MTI. It is undisputed that MTI was a valid 
corporation when the contract was signed, and had been reinstated prior to trial. 
Secondly, any event that may have triggered personal liability had been cured by the 
reinstatement of the corporation under U.C.A. §§ 16-10a-1421(3)(a) and (b); 16-10a-1422. 
These statutory provisions provide that "If a business is reinstated in accordance with section 16-
10a-1422, business conducted by the corporation during a period of administrative dissolution is 
unaffected by the dissolution." (Emphasis added). MTI was reinstated under § 16-10a-1422 and 
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therefore the business of MTI did not "discontinue" as business was "unaffected" by the 
dissolution and no personal liability can be invoked under paragraph 11 of the contract. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CONTRACT DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING OF PERSONAL 
LIABILITY BY RICE. 
It is undisputed that Rice signed the contract with Directories on behalf of MTI, the 
corporation as its President. There is no finding or conclusion that Rice signed the contract 
individually, nor is there any finding or conclusion of an express personal guarantee. The lower 
Court concluded that the language in paragraph 11 of the contract contains a personal guarantee 
by Rice if MTI discontinues business. The lower Court is in error. Rice signed the contract on 
behalf of MTI, not in any other capacity. It cannot be presumed Rice signed the contract and 
agreed to be bound in any other capacity, including agreeing to be personally liable under any 
circumstance. See, Dover Elevator Co. v. HillMangum Investments 766 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
The general rule is that offices and directors of corporations are not personally liable just 
because they sign documents on behalf of corporations. See, Orlob v. Wasatch Management 33 
P.3d 1078, 1082 (Utah App. 2001). Rice should not be held liable as the "signer" of the contract 
in this case. The signer was MTI, through Rice. Absent an express covenant to become 
personally liable, Rice did not sign the contract, in any way, individually. 
The proper interpretation of the contract clause which states: "The signer of the contract 
guarantees payment of the amount due either directly or through escrow if the business is sold" is 
that MTI as the "signer" of the contract guarantees payment in the event the business is sold. 
This provision only becomes an issue if the business is sold, and must be read consistently with 
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the following sentence that provides for assumption of the debt by a "New Owner." 
Simply stated, paragraph 11 of the contract does not, under any circumstance, make Rice 
personally liable under the contract. To so hold would expose all persons signing on behalf of 
corporations to the risk of incurring personal liability, without expressly agreeing to such, and 
cause serious questions about the fundamental purposes of forming corporations as a shield to 
personal liability. A critical purpose of the corporate form is to create an incentive to investors 
by limiting personal exposure. See, Brigham Young University v. Tremco, P.3d 
2005 Utah 10 2005, W.L. 221574 (Utah 2005) (this case is slated for publication in the Pacific 
Reporter). 
II. RICE IS NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE UNDER A CORRECT 
INTERPRETATION OF UTAH CODE § 16-10a-1421 AND 1422, FOR A 
CORPORATE DEBT. 
Assuming, arguendo, that paragraph 11 of the contract does create personal liability on 
the part of Rice if the business "discontinues," the business did not discontinue and Rice is not 
personally liable. There is no question in this case that the contract is between Directories and 
MTI. The lower Court found Rice personally liable only through paragraph 11 of the contract, 
combined with the fact that MTI had been administratively dissolved. (Conclusions paragraph 
5). The key fact in this matter is that MTI was a valid corporation at the time the contract was 
executed and the debt arose, and that Rice signed the contract on behalf of MTI. The "signer" of 
the contract was MTI, through its President Rice, not Rice personally. Corporations can only act 
through their officers and employees and can only be bound by the signature of such persons. 
Orlob, 33 P.3d at 1082. To hold Rice as the "signer" of the contract for purposes of personal 
liability under these facts flies in the face of the law as set forth by the Legislature and Courts of 
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this state regarding liability of corporate officers for corporate debts. See, Brigham Young 
University v. Tremco. There is no conclusion or finding or even argument from ERS, that Rice 
expressly agreed to guarantee the debt of MTI. 
The lower Court held that solely because MTI had been administratively dissolved it 
"discontinued" business. Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-1421 and 16-10a-1422 provide otherwise. 
Specifically 16-10a-1421(3)(a) states: "Except as provided in subsection (3)(b), a corporation 
administratively dissolved under this section continues its corporate existence . . . " (Emphasis 
added). This statute goes on to say in (3)(b), "If the corporation is reinstated in accordance with 
section 16-10a-1422 business conducted by the corporation during the period of administrative 
dissolution is unaffected by the dissolution." (Emphasis added). 
Under the plain language of the statute, MTI still existed as a corporate entity. Therefore, 
it is contrary to the law to hold that MTI discontinued business based solely on administrative 
dissolution. In this case there are no facts to support a finding or conclusion that MTI had 
discontinued business on any other grounds. The lower Court erred in its conclusion on this 
issue. The lower Court also found MTI had been reinstated at the time of trial, so therefore it 
must be concluded that any business done between the time of the signing of the contract and the 
reinstatement prior to the trial was "unaffected" by the dissolution. The only holding consistent 
with the statute is that even if paragraph 11 of the contract creates personal liability on the part of 
Rice, it was not effective based solely on administrative dissolution under these circumstances. 
This conclusion is further supported by the language of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-
1422(4) and (4)(a) which states: 
When the reinstatement is effective, it relates back to the effective 
date of the administrative dissolution. Upon reinstatement: 
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a) an act of the corporation during the period of dissolution is 
effective and enforceable as if the administrative dissolution had 
never occurred. (Emphasis added). 
The court cannot give full meaning of the plain language of this statute and hold Rice 
personally liable under any interpretation of the contract. To so hold would question the entire 
integrity and consistency of the corporate form under Utah Law. 
CONCLUSION 
Rice is not personally liable for the debt owed to Appellee. The contract giving rise to 
the debt does not create personal liability on the part of Rice. Even if it does, the events that 
would trigger such liability did not occur under any reasonable interpretation of Utah law. This 
court should reverse the lower Court and dismiss the case as to Rice. 
DATED this the 20th day of April. 
ATKIN & SHIELDS, P.C. 
Blake S. Atkin 
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Edwin B Parry-2532 
Attorney for Plaintiff — —•—•——--~—. 
3782 West 2340 South, Suite #B 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone- (801) 486-2942 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT 
EXPRESS RECOVERY SERVICES, ) 
INC., ] 
A Debt Collection Agency, ) 
Plaintiff, ] 
VS. 
SCOTT RICE d.b.a. MTI 
Defendant. ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
> CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 030200718 DC 
) Judge: John C. Backlund 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for Trial on August 13, 2004 at 
the hour of 11:45 a.m. Plaintiff was represented by its attorney, Edwin B. Parry, and 
Defendant by his attorneys, Blake S. Atkin and Lonn Litchfield. The Court having 
reviewed the pleadings in this matter, having heard the testimony presented by Jamie 
Grater for Plaintiff and Scott Rice for Defendant and for good cause appearing makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that Phone Directories Company, Inc. (Directories) and 
Memory Technologies, Inc. (MTI) entered into a written advertising contract wherein 
Directories agreed to place advertisements in the Provo and Mt. Nebo directories on 
behalf of MTI and MTI agreed to pay for said ads. 
2. The Court finds that at the time the contract was signed, October 13, 2001, 
that MTI was an active Utah Corporation and that Scott Rice was an individual 
authorized to enter into contracts on behalf of MTI. 
3. The Court finds that the contract between the Directories and MTI was 
entered into knowingly and intentionally by the parties and that the terms of the contract 
were spelled out on its face. The Court farther finds that all parties to the contract were 
competent and fully capable of entering into said contract. 
4. The Defendant argued that Directories failed to comply with the terms of 
the contract in that Directories did not submit proofs of the ads to MTI or Rice prior to 
the publication of the ads. The Court finds, based upon the evidence that proofs of the 
ads were mailed to MTI/Rice by Directories via first class mail as required in the written 
contract. 
5. The Court finds that the ads were printed in the directories as provided in 
the contract between the parties. 
6. The Court finds that no payment was made pursuant to the contract 
between the parties. 
7. The Court finds that the amount due pursuant to the contract's face is 
$648.00. 
8. The Court finds that the contract in Paragraph 4 of the contract that 
MTI/Rice agreed to pay all costs of collection, which include collection agency fees. The 
Court further finds that the total due pursuant to the contract is $914.16 in principal and 
collection agency fees. 
9. The Court finds that Directories assigned the claim for the balance of 
$914.16 owed for the unpaid ads to Express Recovery Service, Inc. (ERS) and that said 
assignment was valid. 
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10. The Court finds that at the time ERS commenced litigation in this matter 
that MTI had allowed its corporate status to expire. It further finds that MTI had been 
involuntarily suspended by the Department of Commerce at the time litigation had been 
commenced. 
11. The Court finds that the Department of Commerce subsequently reinstated 
MTI as a corporation and that it was a valid corporation at the time of the trial. 
12. The Court finds that the contract provides that the signer of the contract 
promises to personally guarantee payment of the obligation created thereby in the event 
the corporate obligor sells or discontinues the business. 
13. The Court finds that the language of Paragraph 11 of the contract creates 
personal liability in the signer of the contract on the occurrence of either of two 
conditions, either the sale of the business or the discontinuation of the business. 
14. The Court finds that due to the expiration and subsequent dissolution of 
MTFs corporate status that the business was discontinued and thus the conditions of the 
personal guarantee were met. Accordingly Scott Rice, the signer of the contract, became 
personally liable for the contractual obligation pursuant to Paragraph 11 of the contract. 
15. The Court finds that the contract provides for payment of attorney fees if 
an attorney is retained to collect the sum due pursuant to the contract. 
16. The Court finds based upon the undisputed proffer of Plaintiff s attorney 
that prior to trial the attorney for Plaintiff had incurred a total of 23.0 hours in the 
preparation and prosecution of this litigation. 
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17. The Court finds that Plaintiff s attorney bills at an hourly rate of $ 150.00 
per hour and that said rate is reasonable for similar services rendered in the area of 
practice. 
18. The Court finds that the attorney's fees to date of trial, but not including 
the trial itself, total $3450.00. 
19. The Court finds that Plaintiffs attorney is entitled to additional 
compensation for time spent at trial and in preparing the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and the Judgment in this matter as set forth in a supporting affidavit to accompany 
said pleadings. 
20. The Court finds that the contract provides for interest to accrue at the rate 
of 18% per annum on all unpaid accounts and that the interest owing to the date of trial is 
the sum of $52.29. 
21. The Court finds that court costs were incurred in this matter in the sum of 
$60.00 and that said costs are recoverable pursuant to the contract and Utah law. 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING the Court enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The signed contract entered into between MTI and Directories is a valid 
and enforceable agreement between the parties. 
2. Directories complied with the all of the terms of the contract and 
performed as agreed therein. 
3. That the Defendant, Scott Rice, is personally responsible for the 
obligations created by the contract due to the personal guarantee provisions of the 
contract. 
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4. That Scott Rice is personally liable because at the time of the 
commencement of the litigation MT1 did not exist as a legal entity due to the expiration 
of its charter and subsequent involuntary dissolution by the Department of Commerce. 
5. The Defendant argued that because the corporation was reinstated 
subsequent to the date litigation was commenced, and prior to trial, that pursuant to 
Section 16-10a-1422(4) Rice was not responsible for the obligation and the liability was 
strictly that of MTI. Defendant further argued that since the statute states that the 
reinstatement relates back to the date of dissolution that the MTI was the appropriate 
party to be pursued as the Defendant in this action. The Court rules that since the 
litigation was commenced prior to the reinstatement of MTI that Rice is the proper and 
only party defendant in this action because of the non-existence of MTI at the time the 
suit was commenced. As the signer of the contract containing a personal guarantee 
effective if the corporate entity "-discontinues business" he became liable at the time the 
corporation was involuntarily dissolved. The Court rules that it is not the intent of the 
legislature to relieve individuals of obligations incurred during the period of dissolution 
by Section 16-10a-1422(4). Rather, it is to allow individuals dealing with a subsequently 
reinstated entity to hold the entity responsible for any acts made during the period of 
dissolution should the entity attempt to escape liability for those acts performed on its 
behalf during its period of dissolution. To argue that an individual can escape liability for 
his personal guarantee when it is clearly effective at the time relief under the personal 
guarantee is sought is clearly beyond the scope of the intent of the legislature. The 
purpose of Section 16-10a-1422(4) is to protect those dealing with the entity while it is 
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dissolved not to protect individuals that may seek to escape personal liability by 
reinstating the entity after incurring personal liability. 
6. Defendant is liable and judgment should enter in the sum of $914.16 
principal together with interest in the sum of $52.29 interest and $60.00 costs of court. 
7. Defendant is liable and judgment should enter against him for attorney's 
fees incurred by Plaintiffs attorney in the prosecution of this action in the sum of 
$3450.00 plus additional attorney fees incurred in the actual trial of the case together with 
attorney fees for time expended for the preparation of these Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and the Judgment in this matter as supported by affidavit. 
8. Defendant is farther liable for any after accrued interest at the rate of 18% 
per annum or 1 Vi % per month until paid. 
DATED this day of 2004. 
BY THE COURT 
(si n-ej 
John C. Backlund 
District Court Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, together with a true and correct copy of an Affidavit for 
Attorney's Fees by United States Mail, first class postage prepaid this > p day of August, 
2004 to: 
Blake S. Atkin 
Lonn Litchfield 
Atkin & Hawkins, P.C. 
136 South Main, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
Edwin B. Parry-2532 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3782 West 2340 South, Suite #B 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: (801) 486-2942 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT 
1 AUG 2 4 2804 i 
EXPRESS RECOVERY SERVICES, 
INC., 
A Debt Collection Agency, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SCOTT RICE d.b.a. MTL 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 030200718 DC 
Judge: John C. Backlund 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the 
above matter and for good cause appearing hereby enters Judgment in favor of Plaintiff 







Cost of Court 
Interest to date 
Attorney's fee 
Total judgment 
with interest to accrue at the rate of 18.0% per annum from the date hereof 
together with any after accrued costs. 
DATED this day of , 2004. 
BY THE COURT 
W 1-%-o* 
Honorable John C. Backlund 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment by 
United States Mail, first class postage prepaid this /2% day of August, 2004 to: 
Blake S. Atkin 
Lonn Litchfield 
Atkin & Hawkins, P.C. 
136 South Main, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(MM VcPc 
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